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CORPORATION, and DOES 1
]
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REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
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CORPORATION and ROLAND
]
KAUFMANN, and DOES 1 through ;
10, inclusive,
Counterclaim Defendants ]
and Appellant.
]
BRIEF OF APPELLEE SIA AKHAVAN

I.
JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(j) (1991).

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the district court act reasonably in denying

Appellant Roland Kaufmann's ("Kaufmann") Motion to Continue Trial
filed five days before the scheduled trial date?

The standard of

review on this issue is whether the trial court abused its
discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the
case.

Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

Did the district court correctly enter a default

judgment against Kaufmann because of his failure to appear and
defend at trial?

The standard of review on this issue is

whether the trial court abused its discretion under the
particular facts and circumstances of the case.

Griffiths v.

Hammond,- 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).

III.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW

The issue relating to the trial court's denial of
Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance is determined under Rule 40(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The issue relating to the

trial court's entrance of a default judgment in favor of Akhavan
is determined by Rules 55 and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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IV.
INTRODUCTION
Kaufmann filed his appeal asking the court to examine
two rulings of the district court, namely:

whether the court

abused its discretion in denying his Motion for Continuance and
entering a default judgment against Kaufmann for failure to
appear at the trial.

The standard for review under both of these

issues is whether the district court abused its discretion.
Recognizing this onerous standard, Kaufmann attempts to bootstrap
his arguments by claiming that he was denied an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the court could properly exercise
personal jurisdiction.
Kaufmann1s attempts to use the issue of personal
jurisdiction to bolster his claim that the court abused its
discretion should not be allowed.

Kaufmann never raised the

argument before the district court that denying his request for
continuance would prevent him from contesting personal
jurisdiction in an evidentiary hearing.

Kaufmann also fails to

cite to any portion of the record to demonstrate that he
requested an evidentiary hearing for the determination of
personal jurisdiction.

In fact, the personal jurisdiction issue

was submitted on the affidavits, memoranda and oral arguments of
the parties.

Kaufmann's claim that the issue of personal

jurisdiction would have been determined at the trial is equally
unavailing, primarily because there was a trial and Kaufmann
chose not to attend and offer evidence relating to personal
3

jurisdiction.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is

respectfully submitted that the district court correctly denied
Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance and properly entered a default
judgment against Kaufmann for failure to appear at the trial.

V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Proceedings at the District Court.

This case arose out of Kaufmann's attempts to purchase
Sia Akhavan's ("Akhavan") fifty percent (50%) ownership of
General Display Corporation, a local commercial sign company.

In

July of 1989, Kaufmann through his agents Robert Radcliffe and
Emmanuel Floor, entered into negotiations with Akhavan to
purchase his interest in General Display.

Ultimately an

agreement was reached and Kaufmann instructed Radcliffe to
execute, on his behalf, an agreement to effectuate the purchase
of Akhavan's shares in General Display Corporation.

Kaufmann

eventually breached that agreement by failing to pay Akhavan the
consideration set forth in the agreement.
This case was commenced by Radcliffe as an action for
damages relating to the sale of General Display Corporation
against Akhavan, Joel LaSalle, and General Display Corporation.
Akhavan responded by filing an Answer and Counterclaim against
Radcliffe, Republic International Corporation and Kaufmann.
4

Akhavan, prior to the trial, settled his claims against Radcliffe
and Republic and the only outstanding claims were against
Kaufmann.
To attain service of process over Kaufmann, a resident
of Switzerland, Letters Rogatory were issued from the United
States and served upon Kaufmann in Switzerland.

Kaufmann failed

to answer in the requisite time period and a default judgment was
entered against him.

Pursuant to stipulation of the parties,

Akhavan agreed to set aside the default judgment and Kaufmann
agreed that service of process was proper, but preserved his
personal jurisdiction objections and subsequently raised that
issue in a Motion to Dismiss.

Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss was

submitted to the court after oral argument and upon the
affidavits and memoranda of the parties.

The district court

denied Kaufmannfs Motion to Dismiss, finding that Kaufmann's
extensive contacts with Akhavan within the State of Utah, all of
which related directly to the transaction, were sufficient for
the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann.
After discovery was completed, the trial court set the
case for trial on March 24, 1992. Kaufmann then filed a Motion
for continuance on the grounds that one of the associates
representing him had a conflicting trial schedule during the week
of March 24, 1992. The court granted Kaufmannfs Motion for
Continuance and reset the trial for July 7, 1992. On June 17,
1992, less than a month before trial, Kaufmann's attorneys moved
for leave to withdraw as counsel for Kaufmann.
5

Kaufmannfs

counsel attempted to withdraw from the case because they had not
been paid legal fees, a fact which they apparently had known for
The trial court denied Kaufmannfs counsel's Motion to

some time.

Withdraw because it would disrupt the scheduled trial.

Kaufmann

then hired counsel to file, on July 2, 1992, a Motion for
Continuance of Trial which the court denied.

Neither Kaufmann

nor his counsel appeared at the scheduled trial on July 7, 1992
and the court entered a default judgment against Kaufmann.

It is

from the denial of Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance and entry of
default that Kaufmann is appealing.

B.

Objection to Kaufmann's Statement of Facts.

Akhavan objects to the following factual statements
contained in Kaufmann's Brief:
1.

Akhavan and Radcliffe Affidavits.

Contrary to Kaufmann's contention, Radcliffe's
Affidavit, 5 9 does not dispute Akhavan's Affidavit, f 13,
wherein Akhavan contended that on August 12, 1989, Akhavan
attended a meeting with Kaufmann, Radcliffe and Floor.
Radcliffe's affidavit supports this fact.

In fact,

[Compare R. 195-96

with 267].
Radcliffe's Affidavit, 5 19 does not dispute the facts
set forth in Akhavan's Affidavit, 5 14, wherein Akhavan claims
that "on or about August 17, 1989, Kaufmann invited LaSalle and
myself to a meeting with F.N. Wolf & Company . . . ."
6

In fact,

Radcliffe's affidavit confirms this meeting.

[Compare R. 267

with 196].

C.

Akhavan's Statement of Facts.

Kaufmannfs Motion for Continuance
1.

This action was originally filed on or about

January 23, 1990.
initial action.

[R. 0002].

Appellee Akhavan was named in the

Subsequently, on or about February 13, 1990,

Akhavan filed his Answer and Counterclaim against, among others,
Kaufmann.

[R. 0015].
2.

By notice dated December 11, 1991, Judge Sawaya set

the trial date for March 24, 1992.

[R. 0892].

On or about

January 8, 1992, Kaufmann filed a motion for continuance of the
trial date on the grounds that an associate at the firm of
Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer had a conflicting trial
schedule for that week.
3.

[R. 0898].

By Minute Order dated February 5, 1992, the court

granted Kaufmann's motion for continuance and on February 10,
1992, the district court set the new trial for July 7, 1992.

[R.

0905, 0929].
4.

On June 17, 1992, less than a month before trial,

Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and LeslieAnn Haacke, counsel
for Kaufmann, filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel.
[R. 0959].

The motion was sought primarily on the grounds that

Kaufmann had not paid his legal fees.
7

[R. 0960].

Further, the

motion stated that Kaufmann had been informed of his counself s
withdrawal and had stated that he did not intend to appear at
trial nor would any counsel appear on his behalf.
5.

[R. 0961].

On June 25, 1992, Akhavan filed a memorandum in

opposition to Kaufmann1s counselfs motion to withdraw.

[R.

0975].
6.

On July 1, 1992, Jeff Bloom, Kaufmann1s counsel,

faxed a letter to Judge Sawaya stating that Kaufmann had been
informed that if he did not appear at trial then a default
judgment would be entered against him.
7.

[R. 1015].

On July 2, 1992, making a special appearance on

Kaufmannfs behalf, Paul M. Durham, filed a motion for continuance
of trial.

[R. 0979].

The court denied Kaufmann's motion.

[R.

1038] .
8.

After the trial on July 7, 1992, which Kaufmann and

counsel failed to attend, Judge Sawaya, by Minute Entry dated
July 8, 1992, entered default against Kaufmann and awarded
Akhavan damages.

[R. 1038].

The Default Order and Judgment and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the
judge's minute entry were filed and signed on July 16, 1992.

[R.

1042, 1050].
Personal Jurisdiction
9.

In Kaufmann's memorandum in support of his Motion

to Dismiss, Kaufmann argued that he made "occasional visits" to
Utah for business.

[R. 0549].

Indeed, in Akhavan's affidavit,

Akhavan testified that he met with Kaufmann in connection with
8

his sale of General Display stock at least six times [R. 0585],
including an August 12, 1989 meeting involving Kaufmann, Akhavan,
LaSalle, Floor and Radcliffe [R. 0587], and an August 17, 1989
meeting with Kaufmann, Akhavan, LaSalle and F.N. Wolfe & Co., a
New York based securities underwriter [R. 0587].
are confirmed by Radcliffe in his affidavit.
10.

These meetings

[R. 0195-96].

In his affidavit, Radcliffe also admitted that Kaufmann

was assisting in providing financing to the merged
Bristol/General Display company.

[R. 0199].

Radcliffe also

refers to another meeting involving himself, Kaufmann and Akhavan
on or about October 24, 1989.

[R. 0200].

All of these meetings

took place in Utah and related directly to the transaction
resulting in this lawsuit.
11.

[R. 0583-92].

Kaufmann never denied Akhavanfs allegation that

Kaufmann had visited General Display during the course of the
negotiations.

[R. 0575].

In fact, in his response to Akhavan's

memorandum in opposition to Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss,
Kaufmann admits that he made brief visits to Utah as an
investment banker looking into this transaction.
12.

[R. 0641].

During the relevant time period, Kaufmann had an

office in Utah at Republic International.

In his November 16,

1990 affidavit, Kaufmann himself states that "on occasional
visits to Utah" he had been given office space at Republic.
0526].

[R.

Radcliffe confirmed this in his affidavit which states

that Republic International made an office available to Kaufmann
on his business trips to Utah.

[R. 0195].
9

In fact, Akhavan met

with Kaufmann at his office at Republic in connection with this
transaction.

[R. 0265, 0585].

13.

Kaufmann also visited General Display and informed

the employees that he would have General Display "running like a
Swiss watch."
14.

[R. 621-22, 625-26, 629-30].
Kaufmann was formerly the vice president and

treasurer of Republic International, which was involved in this
transaction.

[R. 0572].

Despite the fact that Kaufmann resigned

in 1988, he continued to be a financial adviser to Republic,
according to Republic's March 23, 1990 S-l Registration
Statement.

[R. 0574].

During the negotiations with Akhavan,

Kaufmann had signature authority on various Republic checking
accounts.

[Depo. of Jay Hansen, p. 14; R. 0574].
15.

On October 6, 1989, Kaufmann bought a home in the

Pepperwood Subdivision of Salt Lake County, which was
subsequently conveyed to his wife.

[R. 0572].

Kaufmann

confirmed this in response to Akhavan!s memorandum in opposition
to Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss.

[R. 0639].

In addition, in

connection with his involvement with a Utah corporation, Republic
International, Kaufmann's address is listed with the Utah
Department of Corporations as 5292 South 3 00 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

[R. 0572].
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ARGUMENT

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
KAUFMANN'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL.

Under Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to
grant a party a continuance.

Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d

1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 310
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

A district court's decision with respect

to deciding whether to grant a continuance will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is shown that it has acted unreasonably and
abused its discretion.

Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311; Hardy

v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989) [emphasis added].
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the abuse of
discretion standard with respect to motions for continuance is
determined by whether the court's discretion was abused by
"acting unreasonably."

See Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311;

Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1317.
Kaufmann ignores the standard set forth by the Utah
case law and instead attempts to argue the abuse of discretion
standard under the Colorado case law "weighing the rights of the
parties."

Kaufmann's obvious departure and ignorance of

unequivocal Utah law demonstrates his implicit concurrence that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Kaufmann1s Motion for Continuance.
11

In this case, Kaufmann was granted a continuance from a
March 24, 1992 trial date because his counsel had a conflict with
the scheduled date.

Kaufmann's second motion for a continuance,

made five (5) days prior to trial, was based solely upon the fact
that the same attorney that had a conflict with the March 24th
trial date now was not being paid by Kaufmann and wanted to
withdraw from the case.
Since February 10, 1992, Kaufmann and his counsel were
aware that the trial was scheduled for July 7, 1992, yet neither
Kaufmann nor his counsel informed the court until mid June, 1992
that Kaufmann was not paying his attorney, that his attorney
would not attend trial, and that Kaufmann could not attend the
July 7th trial because of financial reasons. Why Kaufmann and
his counsel waited five months before notifying the court that
they would be unable to proceed to trial is left only to one's
imagination, the record does not contain any justification.

More

importantly, the fact that Kaufmann never intended to attend the
July 7th trial [R. 960,1015-16], demonstrates his lack of
justification.
What is not left to the imagination, however, is the
fact that Defendant cannot use his counsel to obtain a
continuance in the first instance (i.e. through conflict with the
trial dates), then use the fact that he has not paid that same
counsel, thereby forcing his counsel to file a motion to
withdraw, to obtain a continuance in the second instance.

To

allow such conduct would permit a defendant to avoid ever having
12

to try the case by tactically manipulating his counsel to obtain
continuances.
The facts of this case are very similar to those in
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)-

In Hill v.

Dickerson, Hill moved for a continuance of the trial two days
before the trial, on the grounds that her expert witness could
not testify.

The trial court granted the continuance and, after

the court later ruled on a motion-in-limine excluding certain
witnesses from testifying on behalf of Hill, Hill filed a second
motion for continuance.

The court denied that second request for

a continuance and the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's ruling and found that it did not abuse its discretion in
stating:
In the case at bar, Hill has failed to
demonstrate that the district court's action in
denying her oral motion for a continuance in
August, 1991, was an unreasonable action by the
district court meriting reversal as an abuse of
discretion. To the contrary, the fact that the
district court had already granted Hill one
continuance in April weighs heavily in favor of
the court's decision. Moreover, Hill's second
request for continuance was solely due to her
own failure to obtain and designate a new
expert witness in a timely manner. Under such
circumstances, we find no abuse in the district
court's denial of Hill's oral motion in August.
[Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311].
In this case, like the facts in Hill v. Dickerson,
Kaufmann was granted a motion for a continuance because of his
counsel's conflict in scheduling, and the second request for
continuance was due solely to Kaufmann's failure to either pay
his attorney or retain new counsel in a timely manner.
13

Given that Kaufmann was already granted one
continuance, and the fact that he was aware of the pending trial
date for five months without taking any action either to pay his
attorney, prepare for trial, find alternative counsel, or make
travel arrangements for trial, it cannot be said that the trial
court acted unreasonably in denying Kaufmann's second motion for
a continuance.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING A
DEFAULT AGAINST KAUFMANN.

Rule 55(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "when a party against whom a judgment or
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend . . . the clerk shall enter his default."

In this case,

it is undisputed that Kaufmann did not appear and defend himself
at the scheduled trial. Moreover, Kaufmann admits on p. 37 of
his brief that he was aware that the court had ordered both him
and his counsel to appear at trial or a default would be entered.
The court specifically entered the default for Kaufmann's failure
to appear and defend himself at the trial, not, as Kaufmann
contends, because he failed to attend a pretrial conference.
Given that Rule 55(a)(1) allows a default to be granted if a
party fails to defend, the fact that Kaufmann did not show up at
trial clearly gave the trial court abundant justification in

14

entering the default of Kaufmann and taking the judgment against
him.
Under Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a default judgment may only be set aside in accordance with Rule
60(b).

Caulder Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982);

Himmeca Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a

motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) and its
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.

Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Kaufmann has failed to comply with Rule 55(c) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure by failing to file a motion for relief from a
default judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), as required by Rule
55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal of a

default judgment is established not from the granting of the
default judgment, but, under Rule 55(c), from the failure to set
aside a default judgment.
There is no question but that the court had adequate
justification to enter a default judgment against Kaufmann for
his failure to appear and defend himself at the scheduled trial
on July 7, 1992.

Furthermore, the fact that Kaufmann failed to

file the requisite Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default
judgment, but instead appealed directly from the entry of
default, prevents him from having standing to appeal that issue.

15

C.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER KAUFMANN,

Kaufmann does not question whether the trial court had
proper personal jurisdiction over him, but instead uses personal
jurisdiction to improperly argue that the court abused its
discretion by failing to grant his request for a continuance and
allowing him an evidentiary hearing on the personal jurisdiction
issue.

Kaufmann1s claim that he was prejudiced because of the

court's refusal to allow him an evidentiary hearing on the
personal jurisdiction issue is unavailing because it completely
ignores the fact that Kaufmann had an opportunity to present
evidence at the trial, but refused to attend the trial. More
importantly, there is no evidence on the record whatsoever that
Kaufmann ever made a request for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of personal jurisdiction either in his original motion to
dismiss or in his second motion for a continuance.
It is respectfully submitted that by failing to attend
trial or to make a specific motion for an evidentiary hearing
with respect to personal jurisdiction, Kaufmann waives any claim
he may have that the court erred in not granting him an
evidentiary hearing with respect to its claim of personal
jurisdiction.

However, if this court determines that the lack of

an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether it was because of
Kaufmann's own actions, is relevant in determining whether the
court should have granted Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance,
Akhavan hereby submits that the facts as submitted by both
16

Kaufmann and Akhavan are sufficient to justify the district
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann.
Under Utah's long arm jurisdiction statute, a person
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts in Utah "as to
any claim arising from: (1) the transaction of any business
within the state; or (2) the causing of any injury within the
state whether tortious or by breach of warranty . . . "•
Code Ann, § 78-27-24 (1991).

Utah

The undisputed facts as set forth

in the affidavits on record establish that Kaufmann purposely
visited the State of Utah on at least three (3) occasions to
participate in negotiations relating to the Akhavan sale of
General Display stock to Kaufmann.

This clearly brings Kaufmann

under § 78-27-24(1) "the transaction of any business within the
state" and subjects him to jurisdiction under the long arm
statute.

Furthermore, the fact that Kaufmann caused Akhavan

injury within the state brings him within § 78-27-24 of the long
arm statute.

The only question is whether exercising

jurisdiction under the long arm statute over Kaufmann is within
the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Due process requires that before a court can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, the non-resident
defendant must have purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum state such that the defendant could reasonably
anticipate being held to court there.

Bradford v. Nagle, 763

P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1988) (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
17

U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).

The focus of the inquiry should also

involve the interrelationship of the defendant, the forum and the
litigation to determine "whether the cause of action arises out
of or has substantial connection with the activity . . . "
Bradford. 763 P.2d at 794 (quoting Syneraenics v. Marathon
Ranching Co.. 702 P.d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).
In this case, the evidence undisputed by Kaufmann is
that Kaufmann purposefully met with Akhavan in Utah on at least
three separate occasions to conduct business relating directly to
the transaction the subject of this litigation.

Therefore, the

interrelationship of the defendant, the forum and the litigation
are substantial.

In the affidavit of Radcliffe, filed in support

of Kaufmann's motion to dismiss, it details those three meetings
and their direct relationship to the transaction.
In Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill. 608 P.2d 244
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant's
contracting with a Utah corporation was sufficient to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

In this regard, the

Supreme Court stated:
The allegations of plaintiff's complaint
show that their claims arise out of defendant's
contacts with this state, which were: (1)
defendant purposely contracted with a resident
of this state, knowing it was a resident, and
(2) defendant purposely undertook to supply
goods to that resident reasonably knowing or
anticipating that those goods would be used in
this state. . . . Defendant's actions were
purposeful, and with a view to derive
substantial economic benefit from the
plaintiff. . . . By these acts, defendant has
submitted itself to this jurisdiction to answer
for any claims arising out of those actions.
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Burt Drilling, Inc., 608 P.2d at 247.
Furthermore, Kaufmann1s reliance upon Anderson v.
American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah
1990) is without merit.

The court in Anderson specifically holds

that if an evidentiary hearing is not held, then the plaintiff
must prove jurisdiction at the trial.

In this regard, the court

states:
Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction by trial by a
preponderance of the evidence after making a
prima facie showing before trial.
Anderson 807 P.2d at 827.
In this case, Akhavan made a prima facie showing that
personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann was proper.

Despite

Kaufmann's claims to the contrary, a trial was held in this
matter where Akhavan put forth undisputed evidence to establish
jurisdiction over Kaufmann.

See Addendum "G" to Kaufmann's brief

and the facts set forth on page 32-33 of Kaufmann's brief.

At

the trial, Akhavan put forth competent evidence that the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction over Kaufmann.

At the

trial, as the transcript shows (Addendum "G"), Akhavan set forth
in detail his meetings with Kaufmann, all of which took place in
Utah and all of which related directly to the transactions
subject of this lawsuit.

Kaufmann's claim that he was denied an

evidentiary hearing is completely without merit.

Kaufmann not

only never requested an evidentiary hearing, but was given an
opportunity at the trial to present evidence to support his
19

position that the district court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over him.

Kaufmann instead chose not to attend the

trial and this court should affirm the judgment of the district
court•

CONCLUSION

The district court acted reasonably in denying
Kaufmann1s second request for continuance of trial and entering a
default judgment against Kaufmann for his failure to attend the
trial and defend himself.

Kaufmann has not set forth any facts

to show that the trial court abused its discretion by acting
unreasonably.

Instead, Kaufmann attempts to divert this courtfs

attention from established Utah case law and interpose the
standard adopted by a neighboring jurisdiction and, in so doing,
raise arguments relating to personal jurisdiction which are not
properly before this court.

Kaufmann was given an opportunity

for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his personal
jurisdiction issue, but failed to attend such hearing.

For all

the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this
court affirm the district court's judgment against Kaufmann in
favor of Akhavan.

/
.

DATED this

\ ^

O

day of May, 1993.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

/

AAA^

DjOUGLAi^H. HOLBROOK
Attorneys for Counterclaimant
and A p p e l l e e S i a Akhavan
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